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NOTES AND COMMENTS
IRRESISTILE IMPULSE AS A DrF=SE IN CRIMINAL CASES
One hundred years ago the House of Lords in England, answering
certain questions propounded in McNaghten's Case,' established a test
to be used to determine the existence of insanity whenever a defendant
pleaded that the presence of a mental disease should excuse his otherwise
criminal conduct. The "ability to distinguish right from wrong" thereby
regarded as the touchstone, became the foundation for all modern inquiry
into insanity as a defense, and has been adopted into the law of most
American jurisdictions. 2 It was a test fairly easy to apply and one not
likely to confuse a jury of laymen. It also served social ends because, by
the verdict, the defendant was either branded as a criminal and punished
accordingly, or else was found to be insane and, therefore, a fit subject
for institutional treatment.
In the succeeding century, however, medical science has progressed
and psychiatric investigations have proved that the vague term "in-
sanity" covers a multitude of mental disorders, physical as well as
functional. It is a long cry from the day when "insanity" was regarded
as being a condition in which the abnormal human being was no different
from the beast of the field, or, as the law put it, was "mad on all points." s
Various types of feeblemindedness have been recognized to exist and
scales of human mental progress, from idiot through imbecile to moron,
have been developed as yardsticks of mental development.
Following such discoveries, some of the courts have broken away
from the McNaghten test, and have promulgated doctrines which recog-
nize that persons not "insane" by that standard may nevertheless be
unable to formulate the necessary mens rea, or criminal intent, essential
to sustain a conviction for crime. Thus, if a person be partially insane,
i.e., sane as to most matters but clearly irrational upon some specific
point, this condition would warrant a discharge upon a criminal accusa-
tion for acts committed relating to that specific irrationality4 though not
for acts committed while the rational mind controlled.
Perhaps the most far-reaching of such developments is that most
frequently referred to as the "irresistible impulse," a condition which
supposes that the accused may have realized that an act was wrong,
morally and legally so, yet have been so much the victim of a physical
or mental urge as to be unable to control himself. Not being a free
agent though fully conscious of the enormity of his conduct, the person
driven by such impulse is to be regarded just as much "insane" as the
one who could not differentiate a rightful course of conduct from a wrong
1 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 1 Car. & K. 130, note, 174 Eng. Rep. 744,
note (1843).
2 70 A.L.R. 659.
8 Arnold's Trial, 16 Howell's St. Trials 695 at 765 (1724).
4 Hopps v. People, 31 Ill. 385 (1863).
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one. This doctrine has, however, met with confused reception, and a
review of the status of authority, a century after McNaghten's case,
may prove profitable.
Of the forty-eight American states, twenty-four have, without quali-
fication, flatly rejected the idea, refusing to regard the defendant's claim
of irresistible impulse as being a type of insanity within the meaning of
the term as used in a court of law, or disbelieving the evidence offered by
defendant to evince the existence of such a condition.5 In contrast, eight-
een states have accepted the doctrine, though of course leaving the
question of proof of the existence of such condition to the jury.6 To
these states should also be added the District of Columbia and the
Federal Courts.7
The position of Illinois on this subject was left somewhat doubtful for
5 People v. Donegan, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 716, 90 P. (2d) 856 (1939); Crews v.
State, 143 Fla. 263, 196 So. 590 (1940); Rozier v. State, 185 Ga. 317, 195 S.E. 172
(1938); State v. Buck, 205 Ia. 1028, 219 N.W. 17 (1928); State v. White, 112 Kan. 83,
209 P. 660 (1922); State v. Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 A. 276 (1901); Spencer v. State,
69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888); State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W. 638 (1935);
Eatman v. State, 169 Miss. 295, 153 So. 381 (1934); State v. Jackson, 346 Mo. 474,
142 S.W. (2d) 45 (1940); Sherman v. State, 118 Neb. 84, 223 N.W. 645 (1929); State
v. George, 108 N.J.L. 508, 158 A. 509 (1932); State v. Moore, 42 N.M. 135, 76
P. (2d) 19 (1938); People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915); State v.
Cooper, 170 N.C. 719, 87 S.E. 50 (1915); North Dakota as said in 30 P. (2d) 1041
at 1047; Hoggatt v. State, Old. Cr. 377, 94 P. (2d) 264 (1939); State v. Riley,
147 Ore. 89, 30 P. (2d) 1041 (1934); Commonwealth v. Torr; 111 Pa. Sup. 178, 169
A. 238 (1933); State v. McIntosh, 39 S.C. 97, 17 S.E. 446 (1893); Wilcox v. State,
94 Tenn. 106, 28 S.W. 312 (1894); Witty v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. App. 440, 171 S.W.
229 (1914); State vs. Fugate, 103 W.Va. 653, 138 S.E. 318 (1927); Lowe v. State, 118
Wis. 641, 96 N.W. 417 (1903).
6 Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887); Wilson v. State, 203 Ark. 920,
159 S.W. (2d) 726 (1942); Ryan v. People, 60 Colo. 425, 153 P. 756 (1916); State v.
Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873); State v. Jack, 4 Pennew. (Del.) 470, 58 A. 833 (1903);
People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N.E. 652 (1921); Conway v. State, 118 Ind. 482,
21 N.E. 285 (1889); Cline v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 609, 59 S.W. (2d) 577 (1933);
State v. Lyons, 113 La. 959, 37 So. 890 (1904); Commonwealth v. Clark, 292 Mass.
409, 198 N.E. 641 (1935); People v. Quimby, 134 Mich. 625, 96 N.W. 1061 (1903);
State v. Leaky, 44 Mont. 354, 120 P. 234 (1911); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871);
State v. Green, 86 Utah 192, 40 P. (2d) 961 (1935); State v. Kelsie, 93 Vt. 450, 108
A. 391 (1919); Thurman v. Commonwealth, 107 Va. 912, 60 S.E. 99 (1908); State v.
Hawkins, 23 Wash. 289, 63 P. 258 (1900); Flanders v. State, 24 Wyo. 81, 156 P. 39,
1121 (1916).
7 So in the District of Columbia it was first conceded that the strict test of right
and wrong was defective, but held that it was not practicable to obtain legal
proof in accordance with another test, the Court also saying: "But this would be
no reason for an adherence to the present rule were a sounder and safer one dis-
covered." United States v. Young, 25 F. 710 at 713 (1885). It must have been felt
in 1929 that medical science had progressed enough to justify the adoption of a
new rule, for it was then said in the same jurisdiction: "The accepted rule in this
day and age, with the great advancement in medical science as an enlightening
Influence on this subject, is that the accused must be capable, not only of dis-
tinguishing between right and wrong, but that he was not impelled to do the act
by an irresistible impulse, which means before it will justify a verdict of acquit-
tal that his reasoning powers were so far dethroned by his diseased mental con-
dition as to deprive him of the will power to resist the insane impulse to perpe-
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a while. The McNaghten rule was accepted in 1859 in the case of Fisher
v. People.8 In 1863 the court was asked to accept the defense of irresisti-
ble impulse but held that, to be a defense, the condition should be caused
by an unsoundness of the mind sufficiently strong to obliterate the
notion of right and wrong.9 By 1884 however the court was willing to
approve an instruction which submitted to the jury not only the standard
test but also the question of defendant's ability to choose between right
and wrong. 10 By 1920 the court had reached the point where it could say
that it was error to refuse to charge upon the question of irresistible
impulse.'1 The next year, in the light of advancements in scientific detec-
tion and treatment of insanity, the court accepted the doctrine as a
settled rule.12 It seems clear, then, that Illinois, though among the minor-
ity, has committed itself to the proposition that an accused person is not
to be regarded as a criminal, even though knowing the nature of the act
about to be committed and fully aware that the same is wrongful, if he
has no ability to make a conscious choice to do or not to do that act.
At least one of the American jurisdictions, once willing to accept the
concept that an irresistible impulse was a form of insanity,13 has since
overruled that decision, but was led to that end by the passage of legis-
lation on the subject. 14 Five other states, which have rejected the doc-
trine, have also felt constrained so to do because of local statutes 15 but
will give it credence if the condition be so strong as to obliterate the
notion of right or wrong. 16
It must be noted also that kleptomania, the impulse to commit lar-
ceny, which is nothing but a strong form of irresistible impulse, is a
validly recognized plea in at least two of those States which definitely
reject the doctrine itself.17
The most recent expression on the subject has been given in Ohio,
trate the deed, though knowing it to be wrong." Smith v. United States, 36 F.
(2d) 548 at p. 549 (1929). The Federal Courts seem to define insanity so as to
include irresistible impulses: Davis v. United States, 165 U. S. 373, 17 S. Ct. 360,
41 L. Ed. 750 (1897).
8 23 fll. 218 (1859).
9 Hopps v. People, 31 ill. 385 (1863).
10 Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635 (1884).
11 People v. Lowhone, 292 Ill. 32, 126 N.E. 620 (1920).
12 People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N.E. 652 (1921). For a complete study of
the subject of insanity in Illinois criminal law, see Clifford J. Hynning, "Mental
Disorder in Illinois Criminal Law," 12 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEw, pp. 19-51 (1933).
13 Adair v. State, 6 Old. Cr. 284, 118 P. 416 (1911).
14 Tittle v. State, 44 Okl. Cr. 287, 280 P. 865 (1929); Arms v. State, 49 Old. Cr.
34, 292 P. 76 (1930); Merrick v. State, 56 Okl. Cr. 88, 34 P. (2d) 281 (1934);
Hoggatt v. State, 67 Old. Cr. 377, 94 P. (2d) 264 (1939).
15 Rozier v. State, 185 Ga. 317, 195 S.E. 172 (1938), cf. Ga. Code of 1933, §26-301;
State v. Simenson, 195 Minn. 258, 262 N.W. 638 (1935), cf. Mason's 1927 Minn. Stat.
§ 9915; People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945 (1915); North Dakota, as
said in 30 P. (2d) 1041 at p. 1047; State v. Hassing, 60 Ore. 81, 118 P. 195 (1911).
18 Rozier v. State, 185 Ga. 317, 195 S.E. 172 (1938).
17 State v. McCullough, 114 Iowa 532, 87 N.W. 503 (1901); People v. Sprague, 2
Park. Cr. (N.Y.) 43 (1849).
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where the court, though failing to find proof of an irresistible impulse,
nevertheless announced the same would have been no defense even had
its existence been proven.' s An earlier case in that state had rejected
the doctrine19 but subsequent thereto the Supreme Court of Ohio said:
"Sanity . . . must suppose freedom of will, to avoid a wrong, no less
than the power to distinguish between the wrong and the right."120 In a
later case, Blackburn v. State2 ' the court came to the conclusion that a
charge to the jury as to whether the accused was at the time of the act
capable of judging whether the act was right or wrong was not different
from the requested charge whether he had the power to refrain from
doing the act although he knew it was morally and legally wrong. Such a
holding would indicate a failure to realize that a difference exists between
the "right and wrong test" laid down in McNaghten's case and the
irresistible impulse doctrine. It may be surmised though, that the deci-
sion might be predicated upon some fear that such impulse might be
used as a defense whether proceeding from a diseased mind or not. 22
Also implicit may be the fear that persons using this defense may not
only escape punishment but, being generally rational, may also avoid
segregation and treatment in a proper institution.
It should be noticed that it is not any irresistible impulse that will
serve as a defense. It must be an impulse caused by mental disease,
i.e. an insane, or pathological, irresistible impulse. Such at least is the
requirement in Illinois, and for such persons the statute makes provision
for segregation and treatment of insane criminals. 23 Similar examples
may be found in other states recognizing the doctrine. 24 Doubtless where
provisions exist for scientific treatment of insane criminals, it seems
more humane and more conducive to social good to allow the defense of
the irresistible impulse since it will result in treatment and segregation
conducive to reform and improvement. The older test of right and wrong
probably must remain the standard wherever public welfare institutions
have not yet been sufficiently developed to make practicable a more
modern test. G. J. MASCHINOT
CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPEAL AND ERR R-REQuISITES FOR TRANSFER or CAuSEs-Wkmum
DEFECT IN NoICE OF APPEAL REQuntEs DIsMIssAL OF APPEAL--In Luner v.
Gelles' the plaintiff received a verdict against the defendant in a person-
al injury action, but upon the return thereof, because of the insufficiency
18 State v. Cumberworth, -Ohio App.-, 43 N.E. (2d) '510 (1942).
19 Clark v. State, 23 Ohio App. 474, 156 N.E. 219 (1926).
20 Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54, at p. 70 (1853).
21 23 Ohio St. 146 (1872).
22 See, for example, State v. Harrison, 36 W.Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892).
23 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Cb. 38, 1 592.
24 Colo. Sess. Laws 1927, p. 296, Ch. 90; Pub. Laws of N.H. (1926), Vol. I, Ch.
11; Pub. Laws of Vt. (1933), § 4020; Ann. Laws Mass. (1942), Vol. 4, Title XVII,
Ch. 123, § 100.
1 314 Ill. App. 659, 42 N.E. (2d) 313 (1942).
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of the damages awarded, he made a motion for a new trial. The motion
was denied and judgment in his favor was entered upon the verdict. Ten
days later, plaintiff filed notice of appeal specifying that he was appeal-
ing from the order denying his motion for a new trial. The notice said
nothing about appealing from the judgment. A motion was made by the
defendant to dismiss the plaintiff's appeal on the ground that no appeal
would lie from an order denying a new trial. It was held, however, that
while the notice of appeal should have specified the judgment instead of
the order denying such motion, still the court would not dismiss the ap-
peal for such "error of form," since there was a final judgment and
plaintiff's appeal, in effect, was an appeal from that final judgment.
The Illinois Civil Practice Act provides that an appeal may be taken
from an order allowing a motion for a new trial, 2 but it is logically silent
on the effect of a denial of such a motion since whatever judgment has
thereupon been entered then becomes a final judgment, and it is from
this final judgment that the appeal should be taken. Before the adoption
of our Civil Practice Act no appeal could be had from an order either
allowing or overruling a motion for a new trial,3 because such a mo-
tion was not a "final order," and, hence, not appealable.
There is precedent, however, for the broad view taken in the instant
case, 4 and there are cases with similiar holdings in other jurisdictions.5
It is true that the filing of notice of appeal is made jurisdictional by Sec-
tion 76 (2) of the Civil Practice Act, 6 but to specify that the appeal is be-
ing taken from the order denying a motion for new trial, provided that
upon denial a final judgment is entered, is essentially an appeal from
that final judgment. A liberal construction of the act, as directed by
Section 4 thereof,7 would require that the appellate courts consider the
effect of the errors complained of, and, if substantive rights are pre-
served, an appeal should not be dismissed for error of such trivial na-
ture as occurred in the instant case. The defendant was not misled nor
harmed by the technically incorrect specification in the notice of ap-
peal; hence the result is a just one. R. C. NErsoN
APPEAL AND ERao2-TnvIE OF TAKwN APPEA--WHETHRm DATE COURT
INDICATES DECREE OR DATE OF SIGNING AND ENROLLING DEcREE CONTROLS-
In the case of Snook v. Shaw," a proceeding in equity, the chancellor,
2 11. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 201.
8 Atkins v. Huston, 5 Ill. App. 326 (1880); J. W. Reedy Elevator Manufacturing
Company v. Pitvowsky, 35 Ill. App. 364 (1890); Peirce v. Ott, 201 Ill. App. 46
(1915).
4 National Bank of the Republic of Chicago v. Kaspar American State Bank, 369
Ill. 34, 15 N.E. (2d) 721 (1938).
5 Chinnis v. Pomona Pump Company, 36 Cal. App. (2d) 633, 98 P. (2d) 560
(1940); Unemployment Compensation Commission of Wyoming v. Mathews, 56
Wyo. 479, 111 P. (2d) 111 (1941); In re Westberg's Estate, 279 N.Y. 316, 18 N.E.
(2d) 291 (1938).
6 Mi1. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200 (2).
I 11. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 128.
1 315 Ill. App. 594, 43 N.E. (2d) 417 (1942).
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on May 15th, ordered a decree in favor of the plaintiff to be prepared.
The plaintiff, through his attorney, thereafter prepared the decree and
forwarded the same to the presiding judge on May 22nd. The decree,
however, was not duly approved and filed with the clerk until June 18th.
On July 14th, the defendant offered a motion to vacate, which was denied
on October 7th. Thereafter notice of appeal was filed by defendant on
November 15th. Plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground
that the ninety-day period for appeal had commenced to run on the
day the decree was rendered, i.e. when the judge ordered the decree
prepared or, at least, from May 22nd when the same had been pre-
pared and mailed by plaintiff to the presiding judge, hence the appeal
had come too late. It was held, however, that the ninety-day period did
not commence to run until the motion to vacate the decree was dis-
posed of, hence the appeal had been taken in apt time.
The court, in rejecting plaintiff's contention, pointed out that for the
purpose of Section 76 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act,2 a decree in
equity never becomes final until it is drawn up by the attorney for the
litigant in whose favor the judgment is rendered, is approved and signed
by the court and entered upon the rolls of the court by the clerk. In this
respect, the court recognized a distinction between judgments at law
and decrees in equity which had early found its place in the law of
Illinois. As a practical matter, the work of preparing a decree in equity
was delegated to the successful attorney, who would present the same
to the court for approval or disapproval as the case might be.3 Upon
approval, indicated by signing, the decree was given to the clerk who
would then enroll the same upon the records. This enrolling was con-
sidered as making the decree final.4 If a decree had been enrolled,
though it was inexpertly drawn and even though caption, date, and
other technical portions had been left out, it still had finality.3
A final judgment at law, however, existed as soon as the judgment
was orally pronounced in open court.6 Failure by the clerk to enter such
judgment did not have the effect of suspending it until entry occurred3
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
3 In Stevens v. Coffeen, 39 Ill. 148, at 155 (1866), the court said: "... the in-
variable practice . . . for near half a century, (has been) for the solicitor of the
party in whose favor a decree is pronounced, to write it out in due form and sub-
mit it to the judge who endorses his approval upon it, which is the authority to the
clerk to enrol it or enter it upon the record."
4 Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 245 at 249 (1872), where it was stated: "The
decree is inchoate until it is. approved by the chancellor and filed for record, or
shall be recorded .... See also Horn v. Horn, 234 Ill. 2,68, 84 N.E. 904 (1908).
5 Dunning v. Dunning, 37 Ill. 306 (1865). See also Freeman, Judgments (5th
Ed.), I, § 50: "But the distinction between a decree and an order for a decree
must not be overlooked. 'No decree can be said to be entered of record until it
is formally drawn out and filed by the clerk. A mere order for a decree, before it
is extended in due form and in apt and technical language, cannot be held to
be a complete recbrd of the judgment of the court.' "
6 Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Ashelford, 268 Ill. 87, 108 N.E. 761 (1915).
7 In People v. Jarecki, 352 Ill. 207, 185 N.E. 570 (1933), a writ of mandamus
was sought to compel a county judge to place on file and certify a record of tax
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Therefore, since a law judgment becomes final, for the purposes of ap-
peal, the moment the same is uttered in open court, the time for appeal
in such cases begins running from the time of the pronouncement of
judgment. It is true, though, that a motion to vacate will suspend both
the judgment and the appeal period until such motion has been decided.8
While the Civil Practice Act provides that: "No appeal shall be tak-
en to the Supreme or Appellate Court after the expiration of ninety
days from the entry of the order, decree, judgment or other determina-
tion complained of. . . ."9 and specifically includes decrees in equity
in its scope, there is nothing in the act which would tend to indicate
that the legislature meant to change the former practice with regard
to the preparation, signing and enrolling of such decrees. Consequent-
ly, the old practice should be regarded as still in full force and effect.
By its decision in the instant case, the court confirms this view.
R. BunnLTr
PLEADING - AMENDMENT - RIGHsT TO AMEND COMPLAINT SO AS TO PRE-
VENT OPERATION oF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - In Mann v. City of
Chicago,' one of the joint owners of certain premises which had been
condemned for public purposes sued to recover interest on the amount
of the judgment previously rendered. The defendant answered that such
claim, if one existed, belonged to the "owner or owners" of the prem-
ises, and that payment of the award had been made to their assignees
in full satisfaction of all claims. The plaintiff thereupon amended his
complaint by adding his co-owner as an additional plaintiff. Defendant's
amended answer, to defeat the claim of the co-plaintiff so added, intro-
duced the additional defense of the statute of limitations on the ground
that the amendment adding her as a party plaintiff was not within
Section 46(2) of the Illinois Civil Practice Act 2 since it attempted to assert
hearings. The date of the judgment for defendant was March 7, and sixty days
were granted for appeal. On the sixty-second day plaintiffs appealed contending
the judgment did not become final because certain other orders were entered in
the proceeding on April 6, operating to stay final judgment until that time. Held:
That a judgment in law exists from the day of the pronouncement of judgment
and not from its entry on the records. See also Black, Judgments, (2d Ed.) I,
§ 106: "In the nature of things, a judgment must be rendered before it can be
entered. And not only that, but though the judgment be not entered at all still it
is none the less a judgment."
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 77, § 83. See also People v. Davis, 365 Inl. 389,
6 N.E. (2d) 643 (1937), where it was held that the right to appeal must be con-
strued strictly according to the statute; and Carter v. Herrin Loan & Improvement
Ass'n, 278 Ill. App. 382 (1935). But see Marks v. Pope, 370 Ill. 597, 19 N.E. (2d)
616 (1939), where defendant had filed motion to vacate but before decision there-
on, had appealed. It was held that he thereby waived his motion and the decree
became final, hence appealable. To the same effect is McCoy v. Acme Automatic
Printing Co., 278 Ill. 276, 115 N.E. 1032 (1917).
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 200(1).
1315 Ill. App. 179, 42 N.E. (2d) 862 (1942).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 170(2), which reads in part: "The cause of
action . . . set up in any amended pleading shall not be barred . . . if the time
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a new and separate cause of action after the statutory period had
expired. The trial court found in favor of both plaintiffs, but, on appeal,
the claim of the co-plaintiff so added by amendment was rejected as
being barred, it not having been saved by the amendment provision.
The test governing the right to amend a complaint so as to state
a claim which, at the time of amendment, would have otherwise been
barred by the statute of limitations, was laid down by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Metropolitan Trust Company v. Bowman Dairy Com-
pany.3 It was there indicated, following the language of the Civil Prac-
tice Act, that, if the facts set forth in the amended pleading arise
from the same transaction as that described in the original complaint,
then the action is not barred even though such amendment occur after
the statutory period had run. Conversely, if the amendment states a
cause of action based on an entirely different transaction, or involving
entirely different parties, the amendment is of no avail.
4
The problem in the instant case resolves itself, therefore, into the
question of whether or not the claim of the joint tenants for interest
upon the condemnation judgment arises from the "same transaction"
so as to fall within the scope of Section 46(2) of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act. In that connection, it must be remembered that it has been held
that interest upon such a judgment as is herein involved is a separate
and distinct claim from the judgment and, as such, is subject
to a different limitation period.5 The right to collect such interest is,
however, vested in the judgment creditor. Inasmuch as the judgment
herein sued upon ran in favor of joint parties, it would follow that
suit to recover such interest should be brought in their joint names, since
neither creditor could alone assert the claim, 6 nor could either alone
release the claim of the other.7 It would seem to follow that since the
"transaction" relied upon in this suit was the joint claim for interest,
the ineffectual attempt, in apt time, by one person to assert the claim
should open up to permit an amendment adding the additional partys
prescribed . . . had not expired when the original pleading was filed . . . if it
shall appear . . . that the cause of action asserted .. . grew out of the same
transaction ... set up in the original pleading .. "
a 369 Ill. 222, 15 N.E. (2d) 838 (1938), noted in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVWw 60.
4 Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N.E. (2d) 280 (1939).
5 Blakeslee's Storage Warehouses, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 480, 17 N.E.
(2d) 1 (1938).
6See Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.), I, 173, § 100; and Seymour, et al. v.
Richardson Fueling Co., 205 Ill. 77, 68 N.E. 716 (1903). In the event either refused
to join in the suit, such person could be made a party defendant under Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 147.
7 For that matter, the judgment defendant when sued thereon would not
have been permitted to off-set such claim by a separate judgment rendered in
its favor against but one of the judgment creditors. See Howe Machine Co. v.
Hickox, 106 Ill. 461 (1883).
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 170(1), permits amendment at any time, before
final judgment, "... introducing any party who ought to have been joined as
plaintiff. .. "
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or else the entire claim be regarded as outlawed. Despite this the
court seems to have concluded that each of the judgment creditors
possessed a separate, though undivided, claim for his portion of the
interest due. If such were the case, the assertion of the demand by one
could not include any part of the demand due the other. The attempt
to amend so as to include the other claim should then, of course, be
regarded as being ineffectual.
By the decision in the instant case, the court has apparently
placed a limitation upon the operation of the amendment provisions of
the Illinois Civil Practice Act which, if correct, follows a preferable and
logical view of the end sought to be accomplished. 9 All would agree
that if the right to amend be not limited to the same claim, the limitation
period would mean little in cases where several persons were injured
in the same accident. By applying Section 46(2) in the manner contended
for by the plaintiff, one of the injured persons, by filing a complaint
within the statutory period, could keep alive, for the benefit of the oth-
ers, all claims arising from the general transaction complained of.
Such, obviously, is not the intent of the law. But the application of that
doctrine to the instant case appears erroneous.
P. M. HICKMAN
9 Parker v. Alton R. Co., 295 Ill. App. 60, 14 N.E. (2d) 665 (1938); Fonyo v.
Chicago Title & Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 227, 16 N.E. (2d) 192 (1938); Weiland v.
Weiland, 297 Ill. App. 239, 17 N.E. (2d) 625 (1938); Nolan v. Sloan, 305 Ill. App.
71, 26 N.E. (2d) 990 (1940), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEw 59;! Menolascino
v. Superior Felt & Bedding Co., 313 Ill. App. 557, 40 N.E. (2d) 813 (1942).
